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1 
INTRODUCTION 
The first 3 shuttle flights that use the Redesigned Solid Rocket 
Motors (RSRMs) will utilize Developmental Flight Instrumentation 
(DFI), as well as Operational Flight Instrumentation (OFI), and 
Operational Environment Instrumentation (OEI). The OF1 consists 
of high pressure transducers which are used on both RSRMs to 
monitor the igniter and motor chamber pressure. DFI consists of 
assorted strain gages, temperature sensors, accelerometers, girth 
gages, and low level pressure transducers. These low pressure 
transducers are installed on the left hand booster to measure 
post-separation aerodynamic loading. OEI consists of temperature 
sensors. After flight 3, all DFI gages will be deleted, and only 
OF1 and OEI will be used for subsequent flights. 
This report deals specifically with debris prevention and 
hazards concerning the STS-26 flight DFI configuration only. 
Continued analysis is being done that will adequately address the 
debris hazards associated with the STS-27 and subsequent flight 
DFI configurations. 
An analysis was performed by National Technical Systems (NTS), 
Saugus Division, evaluating any potential debris that could form 
as a result of any DFI/OFI failure. NTS report 525-3264-1, 
dated 12 April 1988, documents this analysis, and is included as 
Appendix A of this report. 
Because the NTS analysis did not adequately cover the large DFI 
fairings, an additional analysis at Morton Thiokol was conducted 
on the forward dome accelerometer block. TWR-16362 documents 
this analysis. 
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2 
RESULTS SUMMARY 
A summary of the analysis results, as pertaining only to the STS- 
26 DFI configuration, is given below. 
Analysis and testing was done by Morton Thiokol to determine the 
structural integrity of the accelerometer mounting block bonded 
to the forward dome. This is the only large DFI component on 
STS-26. The analysis showed positive margins of safety for the 
component and RSRM case (documented in TWR-16362). 
Smaller DFI components were analyzed and reported in NTS 
certification reports 532-3198-2 (strain gages) and 523-3198-5 
(resistance temperature devices). The potential to debond for 
these items is exceedingly small; a margin of safety of 49. If a 
debond were to occur, no debris hazard would exist because of the 
mass of the part and the constraining effect of the thermal 
protection system. 
Analysis and tests indicate all DFI installations have positive 
margins of safety. The smaller components pose no debris problem 
because of size and containment. Acceptance tests now require 
pulling all larger components to identify any defective bonds. 
In the absence of defective bonds, the larger components pose no 
debris problems. 
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3 
CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis conclusion, as it relates 
3.2.6.5, is listed below. 
to CPW1-3600A paragraph 
CEI Paragraph Planned Verification 
Effort 
Para. 3.2.6.5 ATV-8.0 
Debris Prevention 
designed to preclude analysis for DFI/OFI 
the shedding of 
debris from the 
elements during pre- 
launch and flight 
operations that would 
jeopardize the flight 
crew and/or mission 
success. 
The SRM shall be Debris prevention 
Conclusion / Veri- 
fication Summary 
Analysis results 
indicate no hazard to 
any part of the Space 
Transportation System 
(STS-26) configura- 
tion as a result of 
debris from DFI/OEI/ 
OFI. 
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The Development Fligt-t Instrumentation ( D E )  w i l l  5e installed on the 
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRN) for the f i r s t  6 flights. me DF'I w i l l  
include various strain gages, temperature sensors, accelemmters, girth gages, 
lm pressure impact transducers, and high pressure igniter chamber and m o b r  
chamber pressure transctucers. s m  of these instrumen ts are adhered directl Y 
t o  the motor case, skirt, and nozzle w i t h  adhesives, while others are installed 
N o r  on fairings or  housings which in t u m  are attached t o  the motor assembly 
w i t h  adhesives. Specific DF'I cOmpOnentS have been analyzed for safety of 
flight issues. Past  flight data has been evaluated to ascertain adequacy of 
previous analyses. Available test data has been reviewed and similarity 
analyses performed for Srs 26 thruugh 31 configurations. 
stresses in ccxnpOnentS during * .  Safety of flight issues involve determmuq 
f l igh t  profiles, especially during preflight, ascent, and separation. Margins 
of safety are determined to  ensure they are positive. I f  a potential for 
instrUmerrt debond  occur^, an effect analysis is performed for  that debond. 
Debonding or structural failure may pmduce debris which could damage the 
orbiter thermal protection sys tem (tiles). The analyses also considers 
discontinuities caused by DF'I component failures and the resultant stress 
increases. 
_. 
E h &  of the DF'I cOmpOnentS were analyzed ard/or tested t o  deterrmne ' structurdl 
strength and margins of safety. A f i n i t e  elemmt analysis w a s  perfornred by 
National Technical System w i t h  and w i t h o u t  the larger instrUmen tat ion hasings 
and fairings. 'Ihe f in i t e  element analysis showed acceptable stresses existed 
in the case after installation of the DF'I components; all mrgins of safety 
were positive. me W finite element analysis was verified by an independent 
Mo*~ !Jh.iokol analysis and report *m XRR-17127, -graph 2. smdlla  DF'I 
cc~npdnents were A y z ~  and r e p o m  in NE Certificati.cn repo- 523-3198-2 
(Stsah gages) & 523-3198-5 (m- teqerature devices). me potentid 
to debon3 for these items is a c c e d m g  " ly m; a margin of safety of 49. If 
a debond were to occur, no debris h d z a  d d  sdst because of the mass of the 
partandthe- effect of + thermal pmtectim system. . .  
A f d l y  of adhesives are used in &%t.alling DFI  c apnen t s  to the RSRM. All. 
these adhesives have'mer gone tensile shear st;rength tests. AS the 
envir0;nmental temperature decreases the band strength hmxses. Qnsequatly, 
only maXinarm teTnperature profiles for the installed locations were  considered. 
For structural adhesives, loads g e k k h d  by motor m t h g  pressures produced 
. .. - 
I 1' 
stress fields that masked the t h d  em- parameters. 
Analyses and tests indicate all DFI installations have positive margins of 
safety. The smaller caqxmnts POSE! no debris problem because of s i z e  an3 
cantainment. Aa3eptanCe tests Ixlw require pulling a l l  larger cOmpOnentS to 
identify any defective bond. In the absence of defective bonds, the larger 
cmpnents pose no debris pmblems. 
3 .1  The Micro G r q  uniaxial ah3 biaxial strain gages are 
installed at rnrmeracls locations on the RSRM. Gages are attached to the mtor 
capnents with Micro Meafllreznents M-Bond 200 adhesive. The gages are *en 
coated w i t h  EC2236B/A adhesive which acts as a misture barrier. ?he adhesive 
also provides scane secondary struckual -rt. Installations on the motor 
case are aka  covered by a cork t h d  pmtection system wihich is adhered to 
3.2 Nlls report 523-3198-2, qudLification Test Report for Uniaxial and 
B L d a l  Shah Gages, in paragraph 4.1 addresses the debris p m a t i o n  
requhmnts. The installation d b i t s  positive maxyins of safety of 49..  
Margin of safety was calculated by: 
. \ *  
MS= Installation stren=rth -1 
(*ced stress) (factor of safety) 
Should a debord occur in the vic.-.-ity of h e  orbiter, the deborded part m l d  
Y.2 cmst.ained by he tl m m l  cork. "lar iLd an mlikely deborxl OCEW in the 
nozzle/skirt area, the part would be can5 -. ? a y  by the ahaust  p l m .  Shauld 
the pa:t strike another part of the spa-= Transportation system, no &age 
would c a w  since the w e i g h t  of the strai?. gage k less than one m. 
3.4 me scenarics presentd for the strain gzges apply q m l l y  t o  the 
RIDIS. Paragraph 2.0 of report 523-3198-5, Ccmparative ,W!y-.es of the 
R-istance Temperature Device, list the probability of a C'ebnd occurrhxj as  
rerrcte, margins cf safety greater t ! !  100. m l s  in the vicinity of the 
orbiter are covered by +chemrsll csrk as werc the strain g-acjes. In the unlikely 
ever,t a debond KcCLd CCC*CLT, '-he loose part wculd be resdb-ed by 'he tlmfl 
cork. Shculd a clebxd ma b. the nozzle "lrcat area, the lase part would l3e 
carried away by the exhaust plume. &gain, should a loose part contact a 
ampnent  of the SL'S, no damage would occur since the w e i g h t  of the part .is 
less than one ounce. 
3.5 The girth gage UERd to measure circumferential growth of the Itlotor 
case is a long w i r e  strain gage. me adhesive used t o  attach the gir th  gage it0 
the motor case is Micro Measurernents Group  GA-2. The t h e o r i t i d  structUr;fl 
strength is sufficiently high t o  provide comfortable rargins of safety: tests 
are planned to  determine a value. The gages on the motor case are ca'enl by 
the them& cork in m y  areas. The girth gages are 36 gauge constantan Wire 
such minimal mass that m damage would oaxr. 
which weighs less than an ounce per foot. Any debond that OCUF WXld be Of 
3.6 The operational pressure -cer and the igniter pressure 
transducer are installed on the forward dcm of the RSRM. They are 
mechanically attac%d to the RSRM thrmgh pressure fittings. lhese transducers 
have been u s d  on all previaus s r ~  missions. Fran a debris prevention 
.isassion, the failure scenario nust be different t h ~ n  a trmsducer kaxing 
dislcdged. T h i s  
pressure seal has been tested to 5000 PSI, or 5 t i m e s  MDDP. 
A loss of a transducer muld release hot c d m s t i o n  gases. 
K S  report 523-3198-1, qualification Wpc- fer I-! 2h : A p t  m t i o n a l  
Xessure ~lzducer ,  provides the six l a r i Q j  d d y s  : Lx t”lc transL-aer. This 
report dces not directly address debris preventlm. All transducers are 
installed on the fordanl eane and are mered by a S h a d  ampmts 
of the OpT fa i l ,  i.e. the connector shell, and separate 1-3811 tie pressure seal, 
debris would not m e r  STS cOmpOnentS because of L.?e shraud protection. 
%graph 5.25 of t h i s  M E  report reports t\e safety f a c b r s  exceed 1.4. 
hrmd. 
3.7 The lm pressure transducer is installed h a silica phenolic 
fairir?g, Morton ‘Illiokol d r a w i n g  number 1U82755. me transducer/fairing 
assenbly mntains a shear ply of rubber attache3 t o  the phenolic fairing 
with chemlok 205 primer and 236 adhesive. The shear ply is then attached t o  
the motor with E A 9 3 4 n  strucutzal adhesive. All transducers are mount& a t  
station 763.0 on the right hand RSRM. The transducer is connected via a 
pressure tub= t o  t le pitot  fairing, Morton ?kiokol &awing fU82754. The 
ma*mials and installation processes are the same as for  the transducer 
fairing. 
3.8 NTS report 523-3198-3, qualification Report for the Lrrw Pressure 
Transducer pravides the similarity analysis for the transducer. For previaus 
SrS missions, these fairings contained a secondary bording system. _. current 
analyses i n  th i s  report state this redunlacy is not required. paragraph 4.10 
of the report lists positive margins of safety w i t h o u t  the rectundacy of 1.23. 
TWR-17127, paragraph 2.0 anci 4.0 report similar my. Debond shauld nat 
occur unless there is a d e f e i v e  bond durw the installation process. An 
Acceptance Test, a pull test t o  a safety rrrargin load of 30 IBF, has been 
recamended as a positive means of identify- defective bonds. 
3.9 
?hiokol drawing 1U51216 is mounted on the forward dare. 
TWO accelerometer muunting brackets are used on the RSRM. Morton 
The accelerraneter is 
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ncunted to  the aluminum b r a a t  ard +he bracket is a t t a m  to  the forwaxd d a ~ ~ ?  
With EA934NA adhesive. Table 10 of TWR-17127 shm a positive margin of 
safety of 1.67 for L t s  installation. I n  the unlikely evat a debord or 
capnen t  failure should occur, the debris wauld be contained by the shrmd 
covering the forward dome preventing damage t 3  other SIS CcBnpOnents. 
3.10 A c c e l e m m e t e r  mxlnting bracket 1U75611 is fitted w i t h  EPCM rubber 
shear ply attach& w i t h  Ckemlok 205 primer and 236 adhesive. The w i l d z e d  
bracket is then installed cnto the motor w i t h  w934NA s~ctural adhesive. 
PAe.ss installatiors ccc;v a t  varicus points on the FSRM. A similarity can be 
mde between t h i s  installation and other iI.,stdllations uti l izing the EPCIM. 'Ihe 
P m  system tunnel is an aluminum structure w i t h  rubber ard 
kr-d& w i t h  structural adhesive. '~3ies.e structures present margins of safety 
gre&er +tbn 0.69. 
3.u NTS report 523-3198-4, Qualification Report for Cable BrackLs, 
mntainS an analysis of safety factors for all cable brackets. The brackets 
are of nylon constnicticn and are installed t o  the RsRM with EA934NA stru- 
sdhesive. Table 1 of the subject reprt lists factors of safety for these 
Srackets from a m i n h  of 4.0 on the exi t  cone t o  a high of 9.07 for the 
heater cables. 2411 acceptance test provides pull criteria to idertify ariy 
defective bods that may cccur in the installation process. 
4.0 oJNcIIlsIc%Js 
-Analyses and tests have been p r f o m  to document ccsrcpliance w i t h  cpw1-360OA 
paragraph 3.2.6.5, Debris Prevention. DFT poses no debris hazard to the Space 
Transportation System. 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
1 
I 
TABLE 10 
Stress Analysis Results 
Component Haterial Condition Haximum Stress Factor of Hargin of 
From Safety Safety 
Analysis (psi) Applied 
RSRH Case Cylinder 
Sect ion 
RSRH Case Forvard 
Dome w/ Accelero- 
meter Bonded 
Bonding System 
Fairings - Silica 
Phenolic 
Housings - Aluminum 
EPDH 
20 OF, shear 149,077 (Hoop) 
ply included 
20 OF, No 53,416 (Eoop) 
Shear Ply 
20 O F  
75 O F  
168 (Radial) 
118 (Radial) 
20 O F  1,727 (Hoop) 
75 OF, No 17,319 (Hoop) 
shear ply 
75 O F  118 
1.4 ult. 0.03 
1.1 yield 0.10 
1.4 1.67 
2.0 0.67 
2.0 0.09 
1.4 1.03 
1.4 0.73 
1.4 12.01 
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